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Abstract—As a $183.3 Billion industry controlling 90% of all
world trade, the shipping community is continuously looking for
methods to increase profits while still considering human and
environmental safety. As a result of developing technologies and
policy that make autonomy a feasible solution, at least three
separate organizations are aiming to produce and sail their
first autonomous ships by 2020. Thus it is essential to begin
assessing their cyber-risk profiles in order to rank and mitigate
any vulnerabilities. As existing risk models for physical ship
safety and autonomous cars do not adequately represent the
unique nature of cyber-threats for autonomous vessels within the
maritime sector, this article applies a model-based risk assessment
framework named MaCRA which had previous only been used to
model existing ships, not those of the near-future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to growing demands on global trade and the resulting
economic and environment challenges, various organisations
within the maritime community have turned simultaneously
toward autonomy to tackle significant challenges associated
with ocean-based transportation [1], [2], [3]. The benefits
of autonomous ships are multi-fold (e.g., reduces human
error [4]), and advances in machine learning, ship sensors, and
other related technologies are making this particular solution
increasingly feasible and potentially economically viable. For
example, some estimate a 90% reduction of annual opera-
tion costs with the removal of a ship-based crew [5]. More
specifically, these estimates are not of current ship costs with
its crew removed, but are calculated specifically for futuristic
autonomous ships which, if un-manned, can be stripped of
all human-support facilities, systems, and storage required for
long manned voyages in potentially extreme conditions.
However, existing cost-effective estimates for autonomous
ships disregard the new, potential losses associated with cyber
and cyber-physical attacks. The primary reason for this is
the current inability to comprehensively assess the risks and
vulnerabilities associated with autonomous shipping due to
the novel, untested, combinations of sophisticated autonomy
technology and traditional maritime systems in a unique, mo-
bile, and economically complex context. Although increased
interconnectivity between ships and on-shore infrastructure
have improved efficiency, and more is necessary to support
autonomous ships, this trend also increases potential cyber-
attacks on maritime vessels [6], [7], [8], [9]. To better
assess cyber-threats, specifically for autonomous ships, this
article extends a novel modelling framework named MaCRA
(Maritime Cyber-Risk Assessment) [10], which is currently
being propagated with today’s shipping data, to perform a
parallel exploration of the potential cyber-vulnerabilities and
associated risks of autonomous ships. Specifically, this article
examines three examples of near-future ships, at various stages
of autonomy and designed for different purposes, already
being prototyped with their first voyage planned for 2020.
• YARA Birkeland: Zero-emission, short-ranged, and fully-
autonomous cargo ship by 2020, first prototype in 2018;
• Mayflower Autonomous Ship: Scientific research and ex-
perimental technology, first transatlantic voyage in 2020;
• Rolls Royce AAWA: Multi-purpose ocean-travelling “re-
duced crew” ship in 2020, fully autonomous by 2035.
As the technology and policy for autonomous ships is at a
critical point in its development, this article aims to anticipate
significant risks and vulnerabilities in the future of autonomous
ships based on these three diverse projects and the current
cyber-maritime risk landscape. This is somewhat understood
as there have been reported cyber-attacks [9], although many
have not been released publicly to prevent customers loss [8],
[11]. It is also likely that the lack of adequate cyber-training
has resulted in the misclassification of cyber-attacks as human
error [4], [12]. While the resulting number of maritime-cyber
incident reports are relatively low, as there is sufficient data on
the system technology being used, and related cyber-attacks,
it is possible to calculate autonomous maritime cyber-risks.
The rest of this article is as follows. Section II reviews
and propagates the MaCRA framework with data related to
autonomous ship technology and semantic information. The
following Section III uses the model to assess the poten-
tial risks of autonomous vessels based on the three diverse
examples previously mentioned in an attempt to understand
the wider context of maritime cyber-risks and vulnerabilities
facing the shipping industry. Section IV discusses related
works, before transitioning into the conclusions in Section V.
II. THREAT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
In order to assess cyber-risks specific to autonomous ships,
this article uses a novel application of the MaCRA model,
a maritime-specific framework that assess cyber-risks [10].
This model was based on established patterns within threat
assessment models [13], [14], [15] but until this point has
not been applied to futuristic ships, only present day systems.
Hence, this article attempts to extend this model to further
the understanding of future cyber-risks associated with au-
tonomous ships by evaluating those threats on three main
criteria. Each of the three MaCRA axes model one of these
criteria, which for the remainder of this paper are as follows:
• axiss: Technological systems and their impacts
• axise: Attacker ease-of-exploit required for attack
• axisr: Attacker reward for attacking autonomous ships
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While the model is often represented visually as 3D or 2D,
the model dimension is actually much higher as all three axes
are functions of following attacker and target attributes [10].
attackera = (avector, agoal, atype, aresources) (1)
targett = (tvulnerabilities, teffects, ttype, tresources) (2)
Hence the MaCRA framework is designed to model an
attacker’s attack-vector, goal, profile type, and resources.
Similarly, target models ship vulnerabilities, possible effects
if the vulnerability is exploited, ship type, and defence re-
sources. These attacker and target attributes directly relate to
each other, as attack-vectors are derived from target vulnera-
bilities, and attack impacts are only desirable to an adversary
if the targeted system is capable of producing that effect.
Furthermore, the types and resources of both parties must be
considered together to accurately assess cyber-risk levels.
The remainder of this section demonstrates how MaCRA can
be used to specifically model autonomous ships with these
attributes and its capabilities for creating comprehensive risk
assessment views for a wide range of audiences.
A. System Vulnerabilities and Resulting Impacts
Axiss, as seen in equation (3) of the MaCRA model, is
designed to hold the set of maritime systems used by the global
fleet, their technological vulnerabilities, and the possible neg-
ative impacts (e.g., AIS jamming : collision).
axiss = fvulnerability(avector, tvulnerabilities, teffects) (3)
Conversely, in this paper, the subset of systems modelled
primarily considers specialized technologies meant for futur-
istic autonomous operations. Furthermore, the capabilities of
these systems define the possible negative impacts that can
occur if a modelled system vulnerability is exploited. That
said, some environmental factors such as the physical location
or ship cargo are also considered, as unique cyber-physical
opportunities may occur in specific geological locations [8].
This is particularity relevant to traditionally piracy threats
adapting cyber-attack elements, and the mobile nature of ships
crossing a number of international borders during its voyages.
1) YARA: The YARA Birkeland is considered the world’s
first autonomous container feeder with its first voyage planned
in 2018 and designed with the intention of being fully au-
tonomous by 2020 [16]. Therefore, for the next few years,
three on-shore centres currently handle most aspects of ship-
ping operations such as emergency, operational, and condi-
tional monitoring. Currently this ship has been designed and
approved for only two routes between three ports, 7 and 20
nautical miles (nm) apart, and the route never deviates more
than 12 nautical miles from the coast. YARA’s cargo, specified
as fertilizer and chemicals, is also handled autonomously at
its designated ports, giving it a unique risk profile to assess.
To first determine levels of ship autonomy, this article
defines five tiers in Table I based on SAE definitions for
autonomous cars [17]. From this table, it can be surmised
that the 2018 prototype is tier3, while the final 2020 version
is likely to be tier5, or at least tier4, depending on the
Fig. 1. Mapping of axiss maritime systems, effects and technology, for
near-future autonomous ships (*temperature, light, humidity, orientation ...)
environments it can travel autonomously within. In order
to perform autonomous sailing, cargo loading/unloading, and
mooring functionalities, YARA uses traditional maritime aids
(e.g., anti-collision software), communication (e.g., satellite)
and automated machinery for cargo and mooring, which is
similar to docking. However, its novel battery powered solu-
tion and extensive sensor networks are unique, and the degree
to which these technologies will be relied on is also significant
as decisions will be made primarily with this data. A detailed
breakdown of these system vulnerabilities is discussed in
Section III, but an overview can be found in Figure 1.
2) AAWA: Rolls-Royce has recently mounted a joint in-
dustry project, named Advanced Autonomous Waterbourne
Application [18], [19], [20] to research autonomous ships.
They have also partnered with Google to develop intelligent
awareness software particularly in object recognition [21].
This is necessary, as the planned autonomous ships will host
a range of new sensors along with the ship’s traditional AIS
and radar systems (see Figure 1) [19]. Furthermore, an AAWA
white paper does express concerns about hacker activity,
particularly around communication and navigation technology,
but has not given a comprehensive cyber-risk analysis [18].
As detailed further in the article, each of these technolo-
gies have significant cyber-vulnerabilities, and as proposed
autonomous ships increase the number of systems for input
and guidance (e.g., sensor networks, remote tele-operation
communication) and are wholly reliant on these technolo-
gies for computer-based decisions, the attack-surface of an
autonomous ships is significantly more than traditional ships.
Currently there is no published AAWA plans for sailing routes,
ship type, or cargo for the 2020 and 2035 checkpoints.
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TABLE I
TIERS OF SHIP AUTONOMY, ATTACKER REWARD, AND EoE BASED ON SAE AND MACRA DEFINITIONS.
SAE-Based Ship Autonomy Attacker Reward Ease-of-Exploit
Ti
er
1
Minimal crew required and for most, if
not all, ship operations.
Little to no value for the attacker.
Minimal impact.
Nation State: Advanced Persistent
threats, requires nation-level resources.
Ti
er
2
Partial automation with local crew for
simple tasks, e.g. advanced auto pilot.
Small value to attacker. Corporate: Advanced level attacks
requiring considerable resources.
Ti
er
3
Conditional autonomy, potential
interventions by crew.
Average to moderate value for the
attacker.
Professional: Moderate level of attack
with significant resource investments.
Ti
er
4
High autonomy, mostly self-running.
Local/off-shore crew rarely required.
Valuable to attacker and third parties. Basic Attack: Minimal skills or
resources used.
Ti
er
5
Complete autonomous ship operations in
all potential settings.
Extremely valuable to most players,
large-scale or significant impacts.
Little to no skill needed, often uses
pre-made exploits (i.e., script kiddies).
3) MAS: Unlike the previous two industry projects, one
aimed toward a fully automated ship with limited sailing
routes and another researching more widely and further into
the future, the Mayflower Autonomous Ship (MAS) project
was formed by several groups (e.g., MSubs, ProMare, and
University of Plymouth) to develop an autonomous vessel
capable of conducting scientific research globally as a platform
for new ideas related to maritime autonomy [22], [23]. Thus
MAS aims to incorporate a wide range of new technologies
for autonomous sailing and scientific research such as newer
sensors, new communication technology, smaller autonomous
drones for collecting samples, new propulsion systems, and
integrating renewable energy for testing in the open sea [22],
[24], [25]. While the future design is meant for global
exploration, as opposed to the shipping of goods, the first
fully-automated voyage (i.e., Tier5) has been planned for
2020 where the ship will sail the same route as the original
Mayflower that sailed from England to the USA [23].
With an understanding of these three unique instances of
proposed autonomous ships, a larger set of maritime systems
likely to appear on any future autonomous ship, regardless
of design, can be found in Figure 1. Specifically, these 2D
MaCRA model mappings illustrate the connection between
system technologies and the possible negative effects that
may occur if they are compromised through known, or likely,
cyber-vulnerabilities. This data on near-future autonomous
ships, modelled by axiss of the MaCRA framework, differs
from the previous study based on existing manned maritime
vessels. For example, autonomy reduces the number of on-
board navigation systems, traditionally used for human-based
operations [10]. However, while reducing the number of sys-
tems decreases the attack-surface area, the addition of remote
controlled operations in futuristic autonomous ships increase
the severity and likelihood of successful exploits.
A more significant increase in risk is shown by the mappings
of cargo and sensor systems, as the required communication
channels needed for autonomy make these systems much
more vulnerable and vastly increases the number of possible
impacts during a cyber-attack. Particularly, when compared
to the analysis of today’s systems [10], the use of satellite is
relied upon much more heavily and increasingly central to ship
operations. As sensory data was traditionally used by human
crew to make better-informed decisions, and since autonomous
ships will be solely dependent on this data, these system and
their interactions increase the overall attack-surface, decrease
attacker effort, and further incentivise maritime cyber-attacks.
B. Attacker Ease-of-Exploit (EoE)
The second axis of MaCRA models the ease-of-effort for an
attacker to exploit a vulnerability, which is dependent on their
resources and target defences, as shown in equation (4) using
attributes from equations (1) and (2). When combined with
the other axes, it then becomes possible to assess the risk of
a system being exploited and for what negative outcome.
axise = fease(atype, ttype, aresources, tresources) (4)
Traditionally, the experience and awareness of the crew
and passengers heavily effect cyber-risks [26], however for
autonomous ships, this is not a factor. Although the effects
on cost-saving have been viewed for unmanned ships, the
associated cyber-risks have not. In an attempt to assess theses
risks, this paper makes an addition to MaCRA using Table I
for modelling human-based cyber-defences depending on the
level of autonomy a ship is classified as. In general, however,
while attackers have access to both human and technological
resources, targeted autonomous ships will be primarily reliant
on technological defences (e.g., firewalls), as remote access
is particularly vulnerable due to the mobile nature of ships.
Therefore, to deter cyber-attacks, autonomous ship defences
must exceed the abilities of an attacker’s combined resources,
while also considering its location or proximity to casualty or
piracy hotspots which could increase the ease of an attack [8].
To model the ease-of-effort (EoE) of attacking a vulnera-
bility, MaCRA uses a five-tier system based on equivalences in
conventional computing systems (see Table I). More detailed
descriptions of these tiers can be found in the original MaCRA
paper [10]. As tiers1−5 define the ease of an attack instead
of the difficulty, higher tiers represent simpler attacks.
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C. Cyber-Attack Reward
Equation (5), axisr, models what an attacker sees as the
end-reward value of a cyber-attack. This was designed to
assess whether the outcome of an attack is worth an attacker
devoting the necessary resources to achieve that goal. Past
studies and the MaCRA model have already categorized differ-
ent cyber-criminal psyches [10], [27], [28], however it seems
useful to summarize the most relevant hacker profiles while
specifically considering autonomous ships as their potential
target. Similar to EoE, MaCRA models attacker incentives
using a five-tier reward value system, as seen in Table I.
axisr = freward(atype, ttype, agoal, teffects) (5)
Activists, i.e. “hacktivists”, often have ideological goals
designed to disrupt activities or gain information to alter
the behaviour other organizations. Nominally non-aggressive
toward people, such attackers may be more destructive towards
autonomous ships as there is less risk of harming lives.
Competitors are likely to perform traditional cyber-attacks
to extract data for increasing their market influence. However,
they may also be more bold with damaging or sabotaging
unmanned ships as opposed to manned competitor ships.
Criminals ranging from individuals to organizations tra-
ditionally used cyber-attacks to steal or modify data (e.g.,
for smuggling) or targeted goods at ports and occasionally
in transit. If security on autonomous ships are not vastly
improved, criminals may be emboldened use cyber-physical
attacks to steal goods, ship components, or the ship itself.
Terrorists would not be able to kidnap or blackmail ship
personnel on an autonomous ship, but like criminal-types, if
the physical-cyber security of the ship is inadequate, they
may find smuggling, stealing, or modifying aspects of an
autonomous ships to become an asset, or weapon, desirable.
III. RISK ASSESSMENT OF 2020 SCENARIOS
With an understanding of how MaCRA can be populated
with near-future (i.e. 2020) autonomous ship data, extrapolated
from three real-world projects, this section assess the possible
cyber-risks and vulnerabilities that will effect the general
future of autonomous ships following a more detailed break-
down of the aforementioned systems. As the three examples
chosen have diverse designs, and assuming that the majority
of futuristic autonomous ships will share commonalities, it can
be assumed that they will shall share similar cyber-risks.
Projected risk-assessment views produced by the applied
model framework shall be used assess several cyber-attack
scenarios. More specifically, MaCRA is able to project risks
onto a two-dimensional plane where risk quadrants classify
risks into groups (e.g., low, medium, high), as seen in Figure
2. Following that, this article uses MaCRA’s quantifier to rank
risks categorized as high-risks, or non-acceptable risks, to
determine the top risks and their associated technical vulnera-
bilities for the three examples. Finally, an analysis of common
risks across all three examples shall be made to determine
likely risks all autonomous ships may face in the near-future.
Fig. 2. Projection of MaCRA to risk quadrants for assessing risk.
A. System Vulnerabilities
The Automatic Identification System (AIS [29]) was
designed to prevent collisions by broadcasting, via marine
radio or satellite, ship identity (e.g., name, type), navigation
status, heading, position, course, and much more. Typically,
marine radio class-B-transponders utilize a combination of
GPS and VHF-radio commutation. These technologies already
have known cyber-vulnerabilities both in the signals used and
their protocols for sending data [26], [30], [31]. Given these
vulnerabilities, the risk of adversaries counterfeiting data is
real and significant given the reward and effort involved [32].
Based on the types of effects producible by AIS (see Figure
1), criminal and terrorist attacker profiles should have the
most interest in these systems. However, unmanned ships may
attract more competitors and activists as the likelihood of being
caught is considerably lower given the attacker resources are
significant enough to obfuscate or hide their activity, e.g, use
denial of service (DoS) attack on surveillance.
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) satellites from
(1) the USA Global Positional System or GPS, (2) Europe’s
Galileo, (3) Russian’s Global Navigation Satellite System, and
(4) China’s BeiDou cluster are used in the maritime industry
for global position fixing data. In today’s modern bridges
GNSS is already one of the most interconnected systems.
Therefore an autonomous ship that is reliant on increased
satellite-based communications to send operation commands
and sensory data may be even more vulnerable. This is espe-
cially true considering DoS attacks, packet modification, and
man-in-the-middle attacks. Moreover, satellite’s low-energy
signals are a significant technological weaknesses as simple
congestion and solar activity can have a significant effect.
Therefore active jamming and spoofing [33], [34], [35] are
notable vulnerabilities that could present a high-value, low-
effort attack. Moreover, loss of GNSS can result in the failure
of other ship systems (e.g., AIS) as many are highly dependant
on satellite position. As systems on autonomous ships must
also be able to receive tele-communications with operational
commands from on-shore crew, this increases the attack-
surface multi-fold and attacker incentives as a cyber-attack
may yield complete control of significant ship operations.
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Automated mooring was developed to improve physical
safety and efficiency during the docking of a ship [36].
As modern mooring technology can be remotely control via
radio [36], [37], and is installed in at least two of the examples
given [19], [16], radio and networking vulnerabilities are
of considerable concern, as attackers interested in delaying
operation (e.g., for an individual ship or high-traffic ports),
theft, or damage are able to by exploiting these vulnerabilities.
Deck and cargo machinery include power winches, cranes,
and similar mechanisms for physical operations, such as low-
ering and lifting anchors. This is particularly relevant to MAS
and YARA, as their 2020 plans include the handling of cargo
and equipment, e.g. drones. The effects of exploiting these
systems nominally include stealing, smuggling, and physical
interacting with or damaging nearby entities. Such cyber-
attacks are unlikely on today’s ships as most are typically
manually controlled or locally accessed. However, even today,
SCADA-based attacks are possible [38], [39], and so a remote-
accessible autonomous ship would possess a greater attack-
surface with more possible cyber-risks to consider.
Radio Detection And Ranging (radar) uses radio waves
to determine distance and positions of nearby objects [30].
While radio signals are more difficult to jam than satellite, it
is still possible [34]. Traditionally, the reward for a radar-based
attack is relatively low as a ship is equipped with more relied-
upon navigation systems. However, that is based on traditional
ships with crews who take information from several sources
including visual cues. In comparison, an unmanned ship may
be more vulnerable to compromised navigation information.
Similarly, without a crew, autonomous ships are likely to
be more reliant on their sensors, including radar and similar
technologies that emit sound, light, or infrared which may
increase the value for exploiting their vulnerabilities.
Sensors for environment, external or internal, and proximity
in today’s world provide human crews data on temperature,
humidity, position, speed, weight, and much more. Internally,
sensors are essential for maintaining cargo to prevent ex-
plosions, cargo liquefaction, leaks, and cargo damage. This
includes, but is not limited to, sensors for chemical, electri-
cal, magnetic, radio, weather, moisture, humidity, flow, fluid
velocity, acceleration, light, pressure, density, and temperature.
Technologies such as echo-sounding SONAR, laser-
bouncing Lidar (used by YARA, MAS, and AAWA projects),
and similar technologies that emit and receive signals share
vulnerabilities, such as denial of service. For example, sonar
systems are essential for ship operations, as they detect objects
under the water for positioning, and while some of the bigger
ships often have redundant sonar systems to avoid obstacles,
signal congestion can prevent all of them from properly work-
ing. Therefore, although future autonomous ships are likely
to have larger sets of various sensors for more fine-grained
control, as they may all share similar vulnerabilities and com-
municate with the same systems, all may be compromised with
a few, simplistic cyber attacks, unless sophisticated defences
are in place. Furthermore, remote crew may be unable to assist,
as they may lose access or not be able to differentiate which
sensors have been compromised and which, if any, are still
providing reliable sensory data. Given how prevalent sensors
and sensor networks must be to enable smooth and reliable
remote control, autonomous ships are even more likely than
today’s ships to be targeted, and for a wider range of exploits.
Particularly when considering mid-levels of autonomy, i.e.
tier2−4, systems using camera technology for monitoring
should also be considered as potential attack-vectors. In
today’s shipping industry there already has been a rise in
demands for CCTV solutions to monitor ship operations,
particularly on large ships with massive storage areas, gen-
erators, and important cargo. CCTV technology has known
vulnerabilities [40], [41], that could yield rewarding outcomes
if a cyber-attacker wishes to obfuscate activity on a ship
during cyber or cyber-physical attacks on an unmanned vessel.
Moreover if other camera-based systems are developed for
internal or external monitoring, the nature of their connectivity
to shore-based control centres are likely targets and, if not
defended properly, could make autonomous ships vulnerable.
Voyage data recorders (VDR), although not mentioned in
Figure 1, may be vulnerable to cyber or cyber-physical attacks
to hide other attacker activities. Previous analysis of VDR
has showed weak encryption, authentication, firmware update
mechanisms, and other dangerous software vulnerabilities that
can lead to corrupted or missing data [42]. Analogous to the
“black box” for airplane incidences, VDRs collect data from a
number of maritime systems for incident reporting. Currently
it does not store data relevant for cyber-investigations, but it
is likely that fully autonomous and highly technical ships will
do so in the future. Also, just as a traditional computer’s log
can be erased or modified to hide malicious activity, if an
autonomous ship’s VDR is unprotected, or its future remote-
download protocols can be compromised, attackers may target
this system to reduce their own risk of being caught.
B. Risk Assessment Projected Views
By propagating MaCRA with attacker and target (i.e., YARA,
AAWA, MAS) data from the previous sections, it is now
possible to asses the risks of these autonomous ships and
other future ships hosting similar sets of technology for various
levels of autonomy. When fully propagated, the MaCRA model
can become too complex for effective and comprehensive
assessments, therefore projected views are primarily used
to analyse the three autonomous examples based on their
estimated configurations and operations in 2020. However,
with only three targets and four attackers specified, all the
data can be shown in Figure 3 along with the systems mapped
in Figure 1. The exception is “camera” which was combined
with “environment” to create the category “sensor”.
From here it is possible to begin analysing the effects
of target attributes on their risk profiles. For example, large
reward ranges are assigned to YARA, as it may have no cargo
(i.e., reward of 0) or be carrying 120 TEUs of fertilizer or
chemicals, which may also be valued differently by potential
attackers. For example, as a terrorist may find this type of
cargo highly valuable (e.g., as weapons material), whereas
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Fig. 3. Risk tier values (Section II) for all hacker profiles against the systems of near-future (i.e., 2020) versions of three proposed autonomous ships.
a local competitor may not. However, as the YARA has a
short, coastal route in Norway which (1) is not a known
terrorist hotspot and (2) is close to the local authorities,
this may present a low EoE for attackers both foreign and
domestic. Similarly, MAS is designed to carry cutting-edge
research technology, making them or their components a
more likely target than the samples (e.g., soil) it holds as
cargo. Furthermore, the transatlantic route of MAS’s first 2020
voyage does not take it through any known terrorist or criminal
hotspots. However, as both MAS and YARA traverse narrow
channels, this may increase the EoE for land-based attacks or
causing collisions with other ships or natural obstructions.
Lastly, while less is known of the AAWA 2020 ship type,
cargo, and operations, it is known that the prototype shall
have tier2 autonomy, as a reduced crew will be present. As
the crew of an experimental ship is likely to be well trained
and alert, this could significantly improve the ship’s defences
against misdirection, theft and damage. In comparison, higher-
tiered autonomous ships will be designed to solely rely on
computer-based decision making. Lastly, as these are incom-
plete projects, areas lacking detail use ranges to create MaCRA
risk zones, and occasionally if absolutely no information is
provide, like with cyber-defences, the examples are assumed
to have the same as equivalent ships today.
Fig. 4. Hactivist and Terrorist risks for Yara ship-port systems.
Fig. 5. Summed effect-focused risks for competitor attackers.
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Different projected views can be made from the same
underlying data to contextualize the risks of autonomous ships.
In Figure 4, which projects a specific risk scenario by filtering
out data irrelevant to the desired assessment, the three ports
on the autonomous YARA ship’s route wish to assess ship-
to-port cyber-physical risks by only analysing the relative
systems, namely mooring and cargo. Moreover, the assessors
are specifically interested in the risks associated with a range
of activist and terrorist groups. Once the irrelevant data has
been filtered out and the projected view has been produced, it
is then possible to simulate the effects of additional security
and view the resulting shifts on the same risk projection.
As seen in Figure 4, ranges of reward and EoE tier values
are depicted by dotted lines. These outline the boundaries of
risk zones, accounting for worst to best case scenarios and
changes in attributes, such as whether the target is currently
carrying cargo or not. Specifically, when considering the risk
of YARA loaded with its cargo, the risks may shift toward the
top of their range, transitioning some risks from mid-level to
high. Once projected onto risk quadrants, assessors can quickly
determine that the top risks or main concerns are DoS by
activists and theft by terrorists (see Figure 4). Thus, increased
security in the local port areas shall lower the risks, as shown
with arrows. Later, as attackers evolve those risks may rise
again. Lastly, aside from risk zones and quadrants, MaCRA can
quantify and rank risks with a risk indicator function [10], as
shown with the high-level risks in Figures 4 and 6.
The second assessment compares risks to MAS and AAWA
with Figure 5. Specifically, as these are cutting-edge ships
about to be sent on transoceanic voyages, the assessor wants to
determine the risks from competing companies also developing
autonomous shipping technology. Furthermore, instead of as-
sessing risk per individual system, this assessment determines
what the most likely cyber-attack outcomes could occur,
disreguariding the system that caused it, by summing the risks
related to each impact. This projected view pushes outcomes
that can be achieved through several system vulnerabilities to-
ward higher-risk quadrants. As no high risks from competitors
is found with Figure 5, no risk values are shown. However, if
the assessor wishes, the threshold can be lowered (i.e., reduce
grey box size) to redefine thresholds for low, mid, and high
risks. While the risk profiles for MAS and AAWA are similar,
as they model the same attacker, factors such as AAWA’s
reduced crew introduce variances in damage and theft risks.
Lastly, to assess general, yet significant, cyber-risks facing
future autonomous ships, Figure 6 sums the risks for all
attackers, targets, and systems in Figure 3. This projection re-
flects three diverse examples of autonomous ships and pushes
systems with multiple vulnerabilities and negative impacts
into the high-risk zone, which MaCRA then ranks. Therefore,
based on near-future autonomous ship designs, the most at-
risk systems for the future are AIS, GNSS, and growing inter-
connected networks of sensors. As for highlighting essential
solutions, all projected views and assessments demonstrate that
safe protocols for remote satellite-based communications can
drastically decrease risks for future autonomous ships.
Fig. 6. Combined risk profile predictions for future autonomous ships.
IV. RELATED WORK
This article does not predict generic statistics-based
risks [43], [44], [45] or maritime-cyber risks facing existing
ships [10], but those specific to the future of autonomous
maritime ships. This is becoming increasingly important, as
the associated technology, laws, and economy continues to
evolve in anticipation of significant breakthroughs within the
next few years [5], [18], [22]. Moreover, the purpose of this
study is not to identify specific vulnerabilities within individ-
ual systems or autonomous algorithms [26], [31], [32], [35],
[46] but instead seeks to understand the cyber-maritime risks
that will arise when all these systems are connected on the
first fully-autonomous and widely used ships. While cyber and
cyber-physical security are notable concerns [18], no existing
solution has achieved a comprehensive understanding of the
new cyber-risk landscape. Hence this study aimed to better
define and quantify those risks, so that future research can
address those identified areas of high-risk and vulnerability.
Based on the above, it is the authors’ understanding that
majority of today’s maritime-cyber research focuses on (1)
individual technological systems, not as a collection of inter-
connected systems [32], [47], [48], [49], and (2) the risk or
vulnerability of today’s technology, with a particular focus on
navigation-based systems [42], [50], [51]. Furthermore, in the
specific area of autonomous ships, most pre-analysis or early
research claim that cyber-security is a top concern [18], [52],
but do no attempt to understand the full maritime-cyber risk
landscape for future autonomous ships, as this article aimed
to do with the novel application of the MaCRA risk model.
Although there are overlaps in autonomy research with
cars and airplanes [53], [54], [46], just as the risk profiles
and models differ between planes and cars [53], [54], [55],
[56], variations in technology and environment dictate that any
model used for ocean-based targets need to be equally sensitive
to the relevant factors, which the applied MaCRA framework
does. However, unlike the original MaCRA study, this article
uses the model to assess risk in a subset the future global
fleet. Furthermore, while this study focuses on autonomy at
a critical time in its development, it is not limited to only
attacker assessments [57], [58], the aforementioned system-
focused studies, or risks limited to geological regions [59].
7
V. CONCLUSIONS
This article performs a novel and necessary risk analysis on
the future of autonomous ships based on three near-future pro-
totypes currently in progress. These examples, with significant
2020 checkpoints, exemplify different futuristic autonomous
ships and allow us to begin understanding upcoming maritime-
cyber risks and vulnerabilities, particularity those pertinent to
cutting-edge sensor networks and remote access. Although
modelling data is currently sparse, this is the first analysis
to assess autonomous ships at this scale and level of detail
in order to guide future cyber-secure maritime autonomy.
Moreover, as autonomy developments continue to advance as
discussed, the MaCRA model can be dynamically updated to
assess the new risk landscape, making it a powerful, adaptive
tool for assessing cyber-risks as shipping continues to evolve.
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